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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
C & J INDUSTRIES, INC.,
a corporation, A. ROBERT
COLLINS and GLADE N.
JAMES,

)
)

)
PlaintiffsAppellants,
vs.

)

Case No. 18327

)

EDWARD O. BAILEY and
RUTH c. BAILEY, his wife,

)

)
DefendantsRespondents.

)

REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
As previously set forth, the issue before this
court is whether the acts of Plaintiffs-Appellants triggered
an acceleration clause in a contract which provides:
"In the event Buyer desires to sell or
assign, transfer or convey Buyer's
rights under this contract or Buyer's
interest in said premises then and in
that event the Buyer must pay in full
the outstanding balance due on this
contract prior to said transaction."
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POINT I
THE HOLDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT
COLLINS AND JAMES WERE BUYERS UNDER
THE BAILEY CONTRACT IS IN CONFLICT
WITH THE HOLDING OF THIS COURT ON THE
FIRST APPEAL OF THIS-CASE AND SHOULD
BE REVERSED UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF
THE LAW OF THE CASE.
On the first appeal of the instant case, this court
determined that:
"It is apparent from the second contract
-- and the Baileys consistently point
out -- that the buyer under the first
contract, C & J, is not the seller under
the second contract." 618 P.2d 58, 59.
and:
"This court cannot as a matter of law
ignore the corporate status of C & J
Industries, Inc., and thereby equate C &
J with the individuals Collins and
James." Ibid, 59, 60.
Both the finding that the buyer on the first
contract was not the seller on the second contract and the
finding that the corporate status of C & J must be recognized were necessary to the disposition made on appeal.

A

finding to the contrary on either issue would have concluded
the case in favor of the Respondents (Baileys).
In the instant appeal, Respondents seek to uphold
the decision of the trial court that the buyer on the first
contract was also the seller on the second contract.
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Respondents assert as an alternative basis for affirmance
that this court ignore the corporate status of C & J by
applying the "alter ego" principle.

Both of these arguments

are in clear conflict with the holdings of this court on the
initial appeal.
"The principle of the 'law of the case'
has been recognized by this court.
Where questions of law and fact are the
same the decision on the first appeal
becomes the law of the case and is
binding upon the parties; upon the trial
court; and upon the appellate court.
And this is so however disputed or
controversial the law involved may
be." Davis v. Payne & Day, Inc.,
363 P.2d 498 (Utah 1961); Petty v.
Clark, 192 P.2d 589 (Utah 1948);
Helper ~tate Bank v. Crus, 81 P.2d
359 (Utah 1938).
The policy behind "the law of the case" was
expressed in Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. v. Roosth,
306 F.2d 110 (5th Cir., 1962).

Where there is no change in

the factual situation and only a question of law is
decided,
" • • • [A] most important consideration
is stability in the law -- a sort of
permanence and sureness in decision
apart from the make-up or composition of
the particular tribunal so far as the
person of the Judges is concerned • • • •
Without implying any improper purpose
to litigants or their counsel, or
acknowledging anything more than, as
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human beings, Judges will unavoidably
have differences in emphasis, approach
or view on close questions in given
areas, if the practice is followed for
each succeedng panel' to arrive at its
own decisions, the losing party on the
first appeal will naturally strive to
bring it back a second, third or fourth
time until all are exhausted." Ibid at
117.
It would be unfortunate if on a second appeal
counsel felt free to argue again, as a matter of course,
points decided on a previous appeal. White v. Higgins,
116 F.2d 312 (1st Cir., 1940).
In the instant case, this court made a determination of law, after examination of the contracts in
question, that the buyer on the first contract was not the
seller on the second contract.

The case was then remanded

for a determination of agency.

When the trial court made a

finding on the agency issue, it was to enter judgment for
the appropriate party.
The holding of the trial court on the issue of who
was buyer under the contract reopened an issue already
determined by this court.

The same contracts were presented

and examined and only a question of law was to be determined.
Under the law of the case, the holding of this

cour~

on the

original appeal must stand and the holding of the trial
court must be reversed.
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The same reasoning applies to the attempt to
have this court ignore the corporate status of

c &J

Industries through application of the alter ego principle.
This court has already determined that C & J Industries
cannot be equated with the individuals Collins and James.
No new evidence was introduced on remand to show a need
for application of this equitable remedy.

This court

is being asked to abandon its former determination of an
issue upon a mere presumption that inequity may occur.
Clearly application of the law of the case is appropriate
in this instance.
POINT II
COURTS OF THIS STATE MAY NOT, IN THE
GUISE OF INTERPRETATION, ALTER THE
UNAMBIGUOUS TERMS OF A CONTRACT BY WHICH
THE PARTIES IDENTIFIED AND DEFINED THAT
A CORPORATION WAS "BUYER" IN THAT CONTRACT.
The issue in the instant case is not whether
Collins and James were principals or guarantors under
the Uniform Real Estate Contract with the Baileys.
The real question posed is whether a court, in the name
of construction or interpretation, may designate Collins
and James as "buyers" under a contract where all references
to "buyer" in that contract refer solely to C & J
Industries.
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The importance of the question "who is the buyer
under the contract?" comes from the wording of the acceleration clause in the Bailey contract which is triggered
only by a sale or transfer by the "buyer".

The Respon-

dents and the trial court have unduly compounded an issue
which this court viewed as simple:
"It is apparent from the second contract
• • • that the buyer under the first
contract, C & J, is not the seller under
the second contract."
(Emphasis
added.) 618 P.2d 58, 59.
Rules of construction of contracts support the
simple and apparent conclusion drawn by this court on the
first appeal of this case.
Parties to a contract are free to define terms
or words in a contract.

A contract will be interpreted

in accord with the meaning assigned to words by the parties.
When a word is used in one sense in one part of a contract,
it is given the same meaning throughout.

Radio Corp. v.

Philadelphia Storage Battery Co., 6 A.2d 329 (Del. 1939);
Holter v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 459 P.2d 61 (Wash.
1969); 17 C.J.S. "Contracts" §303.
A court cannot rewrite an unambiguous contract
for the purpose of accomplishing what in its opinion· is
proper.

Sellgren v. Boyer, 297 P.2d 864 (Ore. 1956).
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It is also improper for a court to review an agreement under
the guise of construction or interpretation and then to
provide for a contingency against which a party failed to
protect himself.

Noll Baking & Ice Cream Co. v. Sparks

Milling Co., 26 N.E.2d 425 (Ill. 1940); Mccallum v. CampbellSimpson Motor Co., 349 P.2d 986 (Ida. 1960).
Examination of the unambiguous Uniform Real
Estate Contract and the application of basic rules of
construction reveal the apparency of the holding of
this court on the first appeal.
Paragraph 1 of the Bailey contract acts as a
definitional clause identifying the parties to the covenants
in the contract.

The clause states nc & J INDUSTRIES,

INCORPORATED, a corporation, [is] hereinafter designated
as Buyer."

There are no intervening clauses between

paragraph one and paragraph 3(a) that would support any
conclusion but that the term "buyer" as used in paragraph
3(a) is a designation meaning "C & J Industries".

The only

act that could trigger the acceleration clause in paragraph
3(a) is a sale, transfer, etc., by C & J Industries.
The terms of the "Guaranty" also indicate a
clear understanding by the parties that C & J, Collins and
James were separate entities under the contract and only
C & J was designated as buyer.
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" • • • [I]n order that Buyer may purchase
said property said A. Robert Collins and
Glade N. James desire to guaranty the
performance of said Corporation, each
personally and individually."
(Emphasis
added.)
"Buyer, and A. Robert Collins and Glade
N. James-are each jointly and individually
bound • • • • " (Emphasis added.)
" • • • [A]nd said C & J Industries,
Incorporated, a corporation, as buyer,
and said A. Robert Collins and Glade N.
James, individually and jointly • • . • "
(Emphasis added.)
The signature block which appears at the end of
the contract and at the end of the "Guaranty" also designates
C & J as buyer.
"BUYER:
C & J INDUSTRIES, INCORPORATED
By /s/ A. Robert Collins
/s/ A. Robert Collins
A. Robert Collins
/s/ Glade N. James
Glade N. James"
Even if an argument is made that there is ambiguity
as to who is identified as buyer by the signature block,
the ambiguity must be resolved against the Respondents as
drafters of the contract and in favor of consistency in the
use of the term "buyer", defined and used to mean C & J
Industries throughout the text of the contract and guaranty.
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Although a broader form could have been drafted,
the acceleration clause in the Bailey contract provided only
for the contingency of sale or transfer by the buyer.

It is

not the province of the courts of this state to determine
the wisdom or folly of terms in a contract that are agreed
upon by the parties.

C & J was defined as buyer in the

Bailey contract. The sale in the second contract was made by
Collins and James as individuals.

It is improper for a

court under the guise of interpreting who is a principal to
the contract to alter the unambiguous designation made by
the parties naming C & J as buyer to also include Collins
and James as buyers when the clear provisions of the contract
are otherwise.

To do so would be to create for Respondents

a contract with covenants more advantangeous to them than
those in the original contract they saw fit to enter.

The

basis of the holding of this court on the initial appeal
that the buyer on the first contract is not the seller on
the second contract is readily apparent.
POINT III
THIS COURT CAN NEITHER IGNORE THE
CORPORATE STATUS OF C & J INDUSTRIES
NOR PRESUME THE EXISTENCE OF AGENCY
OF COLLINS AND JAMES AT THE TIME OF
EXECUTION OF THE BURGIE CONTRACT.
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The argument made in Point II (1) of Respendents' Brief is somewhat ambiguous.

The heading

indicates a contention that at the time of the execution
of the Burgie contract, Collins and James were acting
as agents of C & J Industries in distributing corporate
assets following dissolution of the corporation.
If this is in fact the argument, an inherent
weakness in it is the fact that C & J was found to be
a de facto corporation at the time of the Burgie contract.
(TR. 59, 1. 14-23)

The record supports this finding.

The Burgie contract was executed on March 9, 1979, over
two years prior to the issuance of the Certificate of
Involuntary Dissolution of C & J Industries on March 31,
1981.

It is therefore clear that there could have been no

post-dissolution distribution by anyone at the time of the
Burgie contract.

A close examination of the argument also reveals
that no facts or bases are asserted in support of the
contention that Collins and James acted as agents for C & J.
The argument merely attempts to set forth a factual situation
in which an agency relationship could exist, but gives no
reason for concluding that the relationship did in fact
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No matter what setting is created for the Burgie

contract, the issue of agency remains the same.

This court

is thus in a position where it is being asked to presume the
existence of agency because of the relationship of the
individuals to the corporation.

Appellants therefore

reassert the impropriety of such a presumption as set forth
in Point IV of their first Brief.
POINT IV
THE EQUITABLE MAXIM "EQUITY REGARDS
AS DONE THAT WHICH SHOULD BE DONE"
IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE.
The equitable maxim that equity regards as
done that which should be· done is applied only where
there is an equitable obligation which creates a present
•
duty to act
on one party and a corresponding duty to

perform on another.

The principle does not operate in favor

of every person but only for one who holds the equitable
right to have the act performed as against the person
upon whom the duty of performance has devolved.

Pomeroy's

Equitable Jurisprudence, 4th Ed., §365.
Case law reveals that for the maxim to apply,
there must be an underlying agreement creating a present
obligation to perform.

Acts to be performed at a future

date are not subject to the maxim.

West Nesbitt, Inc., v.

Ralston Purina Co., 266 A.2d 469 (Vt. 1970).
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Appellants are unable to ascertain an agreement
between themselves and Respondents that created any duty
to act in regards to a contemplated dissolution of C & J
Industries or which created any right in ·Respondents
to have dissolution and distribution carried out.

In

absence of an agreement creating a present equitable
duty in Appellants and a corresponding equitable right
in Respondents, the equitable maxim is not applicable.
POINT V
THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR AN
ARGUMENT THAT A CORPORATION CAN
RATIFY THE ACTS OF INDIVIDUALS
PERFORMED ON THEIR OWN BEHALF AND
THUS MAKE THOSE ACTS ITS OWN.
"Ratification does not result from the
aff irmance by the alleged principal of a
transaction had by an alleged agent with
a third person unless in the transaction
the supposed agent purported to ~~~-on
account of the reputed principal."
(Emphasis added.) Stat~_ v. Suf?.d_ll~,
281 P.2d 499 (Mont. 1955), citing
Mechem on Agency; Restatement of the
Law of Agency; Annotation 124 A.L.R. at
893; 2 C.J.S. "Agency" §41; 2 Am.Jur.2d
"Agency" §222; and individual cases
from 11 other jurisdictions.
Where an "agent" acts in his individual capac.ity
it must be shown that the principal retained the benefits
or there can be no ratification.

Fuqua Homes, Inc. ·v.

Grosvenor, 569 P.2d 854 (Az. 1977).
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The findings of the lower court were stated as
follows:
"Now the evidence before me is that both
individuals assumed they were signing as
through it.was their personal property"
(TR. 5 9 , 1. 2 5-2 7) •
"But if those same individuals are
buyers under Exhibit 1 and are therefore
bound by Paragraph 3(a) it isn't going
to make any difference whether or not
they were acting as the agent on the
sale of Exhibit 2 or whether they were
selling personally." (TR. 59, 1. 28-30;
60, 1. 1-2)

It is clear that the trial court made no ruling
on the credibility of the evidence concerning whether Collins
and James acted in an individual capacity or as agents of
C & J in contracting with Burgie.

It would be improper for

this court to ignore the only evidence presented as incredible
and hold that Collins and James represented to act or bind
C & J Industries on the Burgie contract.

Inasmuch as the only

evidence on record indicates that Collins and James acted as
individuals in executing the Burgie contract and did not
purport to bind C & J, there is no basis in law upon acts of
Collins and James on their own behalf could be ratified by

c & J.
Another well-settled principle of ratification is
that the persons who wrongfully assumed the power to contract
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cannot ratify their own acts on behalf of a corporation.
Angelus Securities Corp. v. Ball, 67 P.2d 152 (Cal., 1937);
McCray v. Sapulpa Petroleum Co., 226 P. 875 (Okla., 1923).
Under this principle, Collins and James could not ratify
their own acts even if they were made on behalf of C & J.
POINT VI
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE WILL NOT SUPPORT
AN APPLICATION OF THE ALTER EGO DOCTRINE.
Respondents have correctly pointed out in their
brief that there are two prerequisites to the application
of the alter ego doctrine which ignores the corporate
status of a corporation and equates the corporate entity
with its individual owners.
"(l) There must be such unity of interest
and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the individual
no longer exist, viz., that the corporation is, in fact, the alter ego of one
or a few individuals; and
"(2) The observance of the corporate
form would sanction a fraud, promote
injustice, or an inequitable result
would follow." Norman v. Murray First
Thrift, 596 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1979).
While the principle has been properly set forth,
there is no indication of why the principle has any relevance
or application to the facts of the instant case. Outside
making sweeping allegations of fraud and inequity, Respondents have failed to demonstrate amy reason to apply
this principle.
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There hasn't even been an allegation that the
first prerequisite, unity of interest and loss of separate
personality, has been met.

The record does not indicate

the composition of the board of directors at the time
of the Burgie contract.

However, a document attached to

Respondents' "Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Defense
and Counterclaim to the Allegations of Plaintiffs' Complaint"
indicates that at least in August of 1979 there were five
directors of C & J Industries:
James, Jessie Lee James,

v.

A. Robert Collins, Glade N.

Darlene Collins and J.

w.

Downs.

Of these five, only Robert Collins and Glade James were
involved in the transaction questioned.

The number and

identity of the directors of the company is an essential
element to show unity of interest and loss of separate
personality of the corporation and owners.
Once again, Respondents ask this court to presume
that fraud or inequity would result if the corporate form
were to be observed.

Certainly the record will not support

an allegation that fraud has been pleaded or even offered in
proof at trial.
Appellants have continued payments to the Respondents at all times since the execution of the first contract.
Respondents have received and continue to receive the full
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benefit of the bargain they made. Appellants maintain that
Respondents' security interest has been enhanced by the
Burgie contract or that in any case that Respondents remain
fully secured by the original contract and the subsequent
contract with Burgie.
At best, the alter ego principle may state
a triable issue.

In no instance has sufficient evidence

been introduced whereby this court could affirm the
decision of the trial court on the alter ego theory.
CONCLUSION
The provision of paragraph 3(a) of the Uniform
Real Estate Contract between C & J Industries and the
Baileys was not triggered by the sale to Burgie.-

The

designated buyer in the first contract was not the seller
in the second contract.

There has been no proof that

Collins and James acted as agents for C & J Industries when
they individually executed a contract with Burgie.
For the foregoing reasons, Appellants respectfully petition this court to reverse the decision
of the lower court.
Respectfully submitted,

Plaintiffs-
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I hereby certify that I delivered two copies of
the foregoing reply brief this 16th day of July, 1982, to
Thomas A. Duffin and T. Quentin Cannon, 311 South State,
Suite 380, Salt Lake City, Utah.
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